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       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-2196 
____________ 
 
GILMAR PACHECO FERREIRA, 
     Petitioner, 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
       Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A088-001-305) 
Immigration Judge: Annie S. Garcy 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 7, 2013 
Before:  SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 13, 2013 ) 
 ____________  
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Gilmar Pacheco Ferreira (“Ferreira”) petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny 
the petition for review. 
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 Ferreira, a native and citizen of Brazil, entered the United States in September, 
1997, on a B-2 non-immigrant visa and overstayed.  After he failed to obtain lawful 
permanent resident status based on a petition for labor certification, the Department of 
Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear, which charged that he was 
removable under Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(1)(B), as an alien who remained for a time longer than permitted.  Ferreira 
appeared in Immigration Court in July, 2009, conceded the charges, and applied for 
asylum under INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), and withholding of removal under INA 
§ 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), claiming a fear of persecution on account of his 
membership in a particular social group, which he described as his sexual orientation and 
HIV positive status. 
 In his application, Ferreira stated that he was born in Alpercata, Brazil on July 21, 
1963.  His father is deceased but his mother still lives in his hometown of Coronel 
Fabriciano in the state Minas Gerais.  When he was 15 years old, he was lured by another 
young man into the countryside under the false pretense that the young man wanted to 
have sexual relations with him.  After he began to undress, Ferreira saw two other men 
there, so he quickly dressed and ran away.  Ferreira stated that the men pursued him on 
their motorcycles and they were carrying guns, but he was able to escape by running 
toward some houses and hiding under a car.  Ferreira claimed that these men had 
intended all along to kill him because he was gay.  He did not consider asking the police 
for help because the police are hostile to gay men and because he feared revealing his 
sexual orientation to his family.  Ferreira also stated that when he was 18 years old, he 
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had sexual relations with a man who was 28 years old.  Afterwards, the man brandished a 
knife and took Ferreira’s watch.  Again he did not report the incident to the police for the 
same reasons as before.  Ferreira further claimed that he and his gay friends were 
harassed on the streets of Coronel Fabriciano on the basis of their sexual orientation.  He 
claimed that a transsexual friend of his was murdered in a hotel after the assailant falsely 
claimed that his friend pretended to be a woman.  Ferreira learned that he is HIV positive 
in 2003.  He stated that he fears returning to Brazil because he would be beaten or killed 
on account of his sexual orientation and the Brazilian authorities would not protect him.  
When asked whether there is any place in Brazil where he would not be afraid of being 
harmed because of his sexual orientation and HIV status, he answered “No.”  A.R. 98. 
 Ferreira testified at his merits hearing on June 24, 2010 in support of his 
applications for relief.  He explained that in the first incident that occurred when he was 
only 15 he did not think the men were interested in sex; they simply wanted to kill him 
because he was gay.  A.R. 95.  Ferreira testified that there was an attack at a gay pride 
parade in Sao Paulo recently at which a bomb killed one person, and it was later 
discovered that a retired police officer had been involved in the bombing.  Ferreira also 
testified that the interior of Brazil is more homophobic than the urban areas and that he is 
used to country life and does not have family or friends in the city.   
In addition to his testimony and application, Ferreira offered into evidence the 
State Department’s 2009 Human Rights Report on Brazil, which states that: “Federal law 
does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, but several states and 
municipalities such as Sao Paulo had administrative regulations that bar discrimination 
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based on sexual orientation and provide for equal access to government services.”  A.R. 
140.  It also states that the nongovernmental Bahia Gay Group received 115 reports of 
killings based on sexual orientation and gender identity, a decrease from 188 during the 
same period in 2008.  See id.  Parana State had the most cases of killings of gay men, 
followed by the states of Bahia and Sao Paulo.  See id.  Ferreira also submitted articles 
discussing discrimination against gay men in Brazil. 
 The IJ issued an oral decision denying Ferreira’s applications but granting him 
voluntary departure for a period of 60 days.  The IJ determined that the application for 
asylum had not been timely filed within one year of Ferreira’s entry into the United 
States, and that he did not demonstrate that he qualified for any of the exceptions.  With 
respect to withholding of removing, the IJ found Ferreira to be credible and recognized 
that Ferreira’s claimed social groups qualified for protection under the INA, citing 
Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 2003).  But the IJ determined that Ferreira’s 
evidence of past persecution was insufficient.  The IJ found that the incidents described 
were random criminal acts that did not result in serious injury.  Moreover, Ferreira’s lack 
of confidence in the Brazilian police was insufficient to show that the police were unable 
or unwilling to intervene.  He offered no evidence to show that the police were complicit 
in any of the harm he suffered.   
Ferreira thus was not entitled to the presumption of a likelihood of future 
persecution.  The IJ then determined that there was insufficient evidence of systematic or 
pervasive persecution of gay men in Brazil.  The IJ acknowledged that Brazil lacks a 
national anti-discrimination law.  The IJ also acknowledged the nongovernmental 
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organization report of murders of gay men (observing that Minas Gerais was not among 
the states with the most murders), and acknowledged that, in March, 2002, a gay male 
choreographer was murdered in Minas Gerais, but reasoned that these things fell short of 
establishing a pattern or practice of persecution.  The IJ further concluded that Ferreira’s 
evidence that he would be discriminated against on the basis of his HIV positive status 
was insufficient.  Last, the IJ concluded that Ferreira could relocate to a safer part of 
Brazil to avoid the threats he claimed prevailed in his home state, noting that 
municipalities such as Sao Paulo have regulations that bar discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.  The IJ granted Ferreira voluntary departure and alternately ordered 
his removal to Brazil. 
Ferreira appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, challenging only the IJ’s 
determination that he failed to establish past or future persecution on account of his 
sexual orientation.  He did not challenge the IJ’s determination that his asylum 
application was untimely filed.  On March 30, 2012, the Board dismissed the appeal.  The 
Board first held that Ferreira had waived any challenge to the IJ’s determination that his 
asylum application was untimely.  Regarding the claim for withholding of removal, the 
Board concluded that the IJ did not err in determining that Ferreira had failed to establish 
past or future persecution on account of his sexual orientation.  The Board agreed with 
the IJ that the two incidents did not rise to the level of persecution.  The Board 
supplemented the IJ’s analysis, determining that Ferreira’s claim that he was targeted 
when he was a teenager because he was gay was speculative.  The Board reasoned that 
Ferreira did not testify that his assailants said anything to him to indicate their motivation 
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for the attack.  The Board also determined there was no evidence that the robbery was on 
account of Ferreira’s sexual orientation.  With regard to future persecution, the Board 
determined that the IJ properly considered the 2009 Human Rights Report and its 
observation that there is no Brazilian national policy of persecution of gay men, adding 
that the report also mentions gay rights ordinances and a program – “Rio without 
Homophobia” – that was created in May, 2008 in Rio de Janeiro.  The Board also noted 
the reported drop in murders between 2009 and 2008.  The Board agreed with the IJ that 
the evidence of record was insufficient to show that a pattern or practice of persecution 
exists in Brazil on the basis of sexual orientation.  Moreover, the Board noted Ferreira’s 
admission that he could live someplace other than his hometown, citing the hearing 
transcript, A.R. 98.  Accordingly, the Board concluded that Ferreira had not shown a 
“clear probability” of persecution as required for withholding of removal and failed to 
establish the required nexus.  The Board did not reinstate the voluntary departure order. 
 Ferreira has timely petitioned for review.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1), (b)(1).  He contends in his brief that the Board erred in determining that he 
did not prove past persecution because he showed that certain people when he was 15 
lured him into the countryside in order to kill him because he was gay, and because he 
showed that hundreds of gay men are killed every year in Brazil with impunity because 
of their sexual orientation.  Specifically, Ferreira argues that merely because he did not 
testify about what his attackers said regarding their motivation for the attack does not 
mean that there was no other circumstantial evidence indicating their homophobic 
motivation.  See Petitioner’s Brief, at 16.  Moreover, substantial evidence in the record 
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supports his claim that the government of Brazil is unable or unwilling to control the 
killing of, and violence toward, gay men by private individuals and the police.  See id. at 
18.  Last, Ferreira contends that the Board mistakenly analyzed his prospects for 
relocating within Brazil to a safer location, because he testified that there is violence 
against gay men even in the big cities of Brazil.  See id. at 20. 
 We will deny the petition for review.  Where the Board affirms the IJ and adds 
analysis of its own, we review both the IJ’s and the Board’s decisions.  See Sandie v. 
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).  In Ferreira’s case, the Board 
conducted a de novo review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence as it related to 
Ferreira’s application for withholding of removal, and supplemented the IJ’s analysis.  
The agency’s factual determinations are upheld if they are supported by reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.   Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).  Under this deferential 
standard, the petitioner must establish that the evidence does not just support a contrary 
conclusion but compels it.  See id. at 481 n.1; Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d 
Cir. 2002). 
 Under INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), withholding of removal is 
not discretionary: “the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the 
Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that 
country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group or political opinion.”  As a threshold matter, the agency correctly noted that 
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Ferreira’s sexual orientation can be the basis for a withholding of removal claim based on 
membership in a particular social group.  See Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 730.   
An alien may qualify for withholding of removal by demonstrating that he has 
suffered persecution in the past, in which case a rebuttable presumption of future 
persecution applies.  See Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 496, 505 (3d Cir. 2011).  
See also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (“In determining whether an alien has demonstrated 
that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened … the trier of fact shall determine 
whether the alien has sustained the alien’s burden of proof” in the manner described in 
the asylum statute).  If the rebuttable presumption of future persecution does not apply, 
an alien may meet his burden by showing a “clear probability” that his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of a protected ground in the proposed country of 
removal.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).  Clear 
probability is defined to mean that it is more likely than not that an alien would be subject 
to persecution.   See id. at 429-30.  And, as with any claim of persecution, the acts must 
be committed by the government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling 
to control.  See Garcia, 665 F.3d at 505.  It is the applicant’s burden to prove his case.  8 
C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1). 
  To overturn the Board’s decision, Ferreira must show that his evidence was “so 
compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find” in his favor.  Elias-Zacarias, 
502 U.S. at 483-84.  Ferreira has not made this showing.  Persecution “denotes extreme 
conduct.”  Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 n.10 (3d Cir. 
1993).  It does not encompass “generalized lawlessness.”  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 
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477, 494 (3d Cir. 2001) (addressing acts of private violence and xenophobic attitude of 
some South African citizens and politicians toward African immigrants).  Regarding the 
incidents that occurred when Ferreira was a teenager, even if it might be inferred from the 
circumstances that the assailants involved sought to harm him because he was gay, it 
cannot be said that this is the only conclusion compelled by the record.  The attacks also 
could represent opportunistic private acts of violence, and “[w]here the record supports 
plausible but conflicting inferences … [the agency’s] choice between those inferences is, 
a fortiori, supported by substantial evidence.”  Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 219 
(1st Cir. 2007).  Moreover, as the IJ noted, Ferreira was not harmed on either occasion, 
and his lack of confidence in the Brazilian police was insufficient to show that the police 
were unable or unwilling to intervene.  See generally Toure v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 443 
F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 1006) (applicant must show: (1) one or more incidents rising to the 
level of persecution; (2) that is on account of one of the statutorily-protected grounds; and 
(3) is committed either by the government or by forces the government is unable or 
unwilling to control).  Accordingly, Ferreira was not entitled to the presumption of future 
persecution. 
 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Ferreira failed to 
demonstrate a clear probability of future persecution in Brazil.  “In evaluating whether it 
is more likely than not that the applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened in a 
particular country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion, the [agency] shall not require the applicant to provide 
evidence that he or she would be singled out individually for such persecution if: (i) The 
10 
 
applicant establishes that in that country there is a pattern or practice of persecution of a 
group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2).  
Although the materials Ferreira submitted in support of his application indicate that 
violence against gay men, including even murder, continues to be a problem in Brazil, it 
does not establish that the Brazilian government is unable or unwilling to control those 
who are responsible for such violence.  Ferreira presented no evidence that the Brazilian 
state police were involved in the unlawful killings of gay men.  Moreover, the 2009 
Human Rights Report notes anti-discrimination ordinances in the big cities, the existence 
of gay rights groups, and a nongovernmental organization’s report that there was a drop 
in the murders from 2008 to 2009.  One of Ferreira’s articles discusses ongoing 
cooperation between the president of the Commission  Against Impunity and Violence of 
the Legislative Assembly and the police in Rio de Janeiro, including an effort to provide 
training to police officers to deal with homophobic violence.  A.R. 200-01.  In Lie v. 
Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 2005), we held that, “to constitute a pattern or practice, 
the persecution of the group must be “systemic, pervasive, or organized.”  Id. at 537 
(internal quotation marks removed).  Ferreira’s evidence was insufficient to meet this 
standard.  And, “as with any claim of persecution, violence or other harm perpetrated by 
civilians against the petitioner’s group does not constitute persecution unless such acts 
are committed by the government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling 
to control.”  Id. (internal quotation marks removed). 
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 Last, Ferreira’s argument regarding relocation within Brazil is unavailing.  He 
presented insufficient evidence that he faces persecution in his home state of Minas 
Gerais and thus relocation is not clearly even necessary.  Moreover, an applicant cannot 
demonstrate that his life or freedom would be threatened if the agency finds that the 
applicant could avoid a future threat by “relocating to another part of the proposed 
country of removal and, under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the 
applicant to do so.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2).  Ferreira frankly admitted at his hearing 
that he could relocate to an urban and more progressive area of Brazil, notwithstanding 
his subjective fear that no place is safe for gay men, and it would be reasonable to expect 
him to do so. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
